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We analyze the equilibrium spread when the transaction size of informed traders is elastic in the value 
of private information (α).  We show that the pooling equilibrium is likely to be inefficient when 
trade size is sensitive to α and the inefficient equilibrium can occur before the market breaks down. 
The pooling equilibrium spread does not monotonically increase with α, although it increases with the 
elasticity of informed trades to α. The upper bound of the elasticity of informed trades for the market 
to remain open for the active specialist is higher than the corresponding value for the passive 
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Benveniste, Marcus, and Wilhelm (1992) (BMW hereafter) bring to light an important 
intermediary role of exchange specialists by showing that their long-term relationships with brokers 
help mitigate the effects of information asymmetry. The authors show that a specialist who actively 
differentiates between informed and uninformed traders through his long-term relationship with 
brokers can achieve equilibria that Pareto-dominate a pooling equilibrium in which he does not 
differentiate between the two types of traders. BMW provide an important insight that human 
intermediation is valuable in securities markets and the specialist system is a viable form of exchange 
markets. 
BMW’s paper has provided financial economists with theoretical foundations for a variety of 
empirical issues, including inter-market comparisons of execution quality (Huang and Stoll, 1996; 
Venkataraman, 2001), specialist behavior (Madhavan and Sofianos, 1998; Kavajecz, 1999; Harris and 
Panchapagesan, 2005; Anand and Weaver, 2006), the price impact of trades and price improvement 
(Chung, Chuwonganant, and McCormick, 2004), and the informational efficiency of market quotes 
(Chung, Chuwonganant, and Jiang, 2008).            
BMW assume that the volume of liquidity trades is elastic in the cost of trading. Specifically, 
they assume that the volume of liquidity trades in each trading round depends on the absolute 
difference between the transaction price (i.e., the bid or ask price) and the security’s intrinsic value. 
However, BMW assume that informed traders are constrained by an aggregate position limit and thus 
always trade a fixed size. BMW hold that the latter assumption is necessary to rule out infinite 
demand for securities that otherwise would result from the assumption of risk neutrality. 
In this study, we analyze how informed agents’ trading behavior affects market equilibrium by 
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assuming that the transaction size of informed traders is elastic in the expected profit of trades. 
Specifically, we assume that the transaction size of informed traders is a positive, linear function of 
the difference between the value of private information and the spread charged on their trades by the 
specialist.1 The trading behavior of informed traders in our model is more in line with theoretical 
constructs and empirical evidence in prior studies than the one employed in BMW. For example, 
Easley and O’Hara (1987) examine the effect of trade size on stock prices. They show that trade size 
introduces an adverse selection problem into trading because informed traders, given that they wish to 
trade, prefer to trade large sizes at any given price. Consequently, market makers’ pricing strategies 
depend on trade size, with large trades being executed at less favorable prices.  
Our assumption on informed trading is also consistent with the one employed in Kyle (1985). In 
Kyle (1985), the informed traders want to trade aggressively, e.g., buying a large quantity if their 
information is positive. Although our model is similar in spirit to Kyle’s model, it differs from his in 
that we neither assume that the market maker protects himself by setting a price that is increasing in 
the net order flow nor formulate the profit maximizing behavior of the informed trader per se.2 Our 
model incorporates only the notion that informed traders submit larger orders when the value of their 
private information is greater. 
Reexamining the BMW model under an alternative, more realistic assumption on informed 
trading is important for at least two reasons. First, it would be interesting to find out whether the main 
results of the BMW model (derived under the restriction assumption that informed traders always 
trade a fixed size) can also be obtained when informed traders trade larger sizes when they have more 
                                                        
1 In our model, the transaction size of informed traders is endogenously bounded to ensure that the market 
remains open. 
2 Although we do not model this behavior, our model predicts that the market maker quotes wider spreads when 
the elasticity of informed trades to trading profits is higher. 
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valuable information. Second, it would be interesting to find out whether the alternative assumption 
yields additional model implications. 
As in BMW, we analyze the interaction between the specialist, broker, informed trader, and 
liquidity trader. We consider two types (i.e., passive and active) of specialists and consequently two 
types (i.e., pooling and separating) of equilibrium. We show that some of BMW’s original results are 
robust to the behavior of informed traders. For example, we show that the result of BMW that the 
separating equilibrium Pareto-dominates the pooling equilibrium holds even when the transaction size 
of informed traders is elastic in the expected profit of trades. The specialist can allow more severe 
information asymmetry and both the uninformed and informed traders face more favorable trading 
terms in the separating equilibrium in which the specialist forces brokers to voluntarily disclose the 
type (i.e., informed vs. uninformed) of traders that they are representing. We also show that the power 
to sanction those who exploit private information can keep the market open and achieve an efficient 
equilibrium under conditions of severe adverse selection in which the pooling market would otherwise 
close if the active specialist has enough leverage over brokers. 
  More importantly, our model yields a number of new insights that are obscured by BMW’s 
assumption that informed traders always trade a fixed size. First, we show that the pooling 
equilibrium is likely to be inefficient when trade size is highly sensitive to the value of private 
information (α) and the inefficient equilibrium can occur before the market breaks down. In contrast 
to BMW, the pooling equilibrium spread does not monotonically increase with α. The pooling 
equilibrium spread increases with α at the low level of α and then decreases as α becomes larger. The 
specialist narrows the spread as α becomes larger because greater expected losses to informed traders 
can be offset by greater revenues from liquidity traders. This result differs sharply from the result of 
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the BMW model that the pooling equilibrium spread increases monotonically with α. We also show 
that the pooling spread increases monotonically with α if liquidity trading is inelastic to trading cost 
and this positive relation reflects the specialist’s need to curve information-based trading given fixed 
liquidity trading. Finally, we show that the upper bound of the elasticity of informed trades to the 
value of private information for the market to remain open for the active specialist is higher than the 
upper bound for the passive specialist if the specialist has enough leverage over brokers. 
  
2. The model 
We follow the basic setup and nomenclature of BMW. All traders have the same information 
initially and thus assign an identical intrinsic value, p*, to an asset. The only source of uncertainty is 
the possibility of a random shock to p* before a round of trade that becomes public information only 
after the trading round is completed. The random shock, which occurs with probability π, will lead to 
a revision of the asset’s intrinsic value to either p* + α or p* - α, with each revision having equal 
probability. 
The volume of liquidity trades is elastic in the cost of trading. Specifically, liquidity trading 
volume in each round depends on the absolute difference between transaction prices and the asset’s 
intrinsic value (i.e., ask price – p* for buyer-initiated trades and p* – bid price for seller-initiated trades) 
or one-half of the bid-ask spread charged on liquidity traders, Sl. A stable proportion of informed 
traders learn of a shock to p* when it occurs. Thus with probability π, informed traders will participate 
in a round of trade. We assume that the trade size of informed traders depends on the value of private 
information. Informed traders learn of a shock to p* when it occurs and use its value α in their trading. 
Specifically, we assume that the transaction size of informed traders increases with the difference 
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between α and the trading cost ( is ) imposed on informed traders by the specialist. 
Given the above setup, we now define the demand schedules of liquidity and informed traders 
as well as the revenue and cost functions of the specialist. As in BMW, the transaction size of liquidity 
traders (
l
q ) is related to the spread ( ls ) in the following manner: 
lll sqsVq  *)( ,                       (1) 
where *q is the transaction size of liquidity traders when the spread is zero and   denotes the 
sensitivity of liquidity trading to the spread. The transaction size of informed trades ( iq ) is assumed 
to be related to the net value of private information in the following manner: 
)()( iii sTsVq   ,                       (2) 
where T denotes the sensitivity of informed trading to the value of private information ( ) net of 
trading cost ( is ). 
 Because each liquidity trade crossed results in a net revenue of 2 ls for the specialist, the 
specialist’s total revenue from liquidity trading, )( lsR , is   
)*(2)( lll sqssR  .                            (3) 
The specialist anticipates informed buy orders for )( isT  shares when good information is 
forthcoming and informed sell orders for )( isT  shares when bad information is forthcoming. The 
cost per share to the specialist is the mispricing by net of the spread charged on the trades ( is ). The 
total cost following a price shock is therefore ))(( ii ssT   . Because the probability that 
information is forthcoming is π, the expected cost borne by the specialist in each period is         




3. Equilibrium and the specialist 
We consider two types of specialists who differ in their ability to distinguish informed traders 
from liquidity traders.  
 
3.1. Equilibrium with a passive specialist 
In this section, we consider a pooling equilibrium under the passive specialist system. This case 
is characterized by a passive specialist who, by definition, does not differentiate between informed 
and liquidity traders. The specialist uses an identical spread ilp sss   for the two types of traders. 
The equilibrium with the passive specialist is defined by a pooling spread, ps , for which the 
specialist’s expected loss to informed traders is equal to the trading gain from liquidity traders. 
Replacing ls and is in equations (3) and (4) with ps , the zero-profit equilibrium condition becomes   
0)()(  pp sCsR .                            (5) 
By substituting equations (3) and (4) into equation (5), we obtain the following quadratic 
equilibrium equation: 
0))(()*(2  pppp ssTsqs  .                  (6) 
Solving the quadratic equation yields two zero-profit spreads. See Figure 1 for a graphical 
illustration of the specialist’s revenue and cost curves, together with two feasible spreads. Competition 
ensures that the equilibrium spread is the smaller of the two feasible spreads. If the specialist quotes a 
spread that is greater than α, the informed traders will not trade. As a result, the cost curve C(s) 



















.             (7) 
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Equation (7) shows that the pooling spread is zero if  ,  , or T is zero, indicating that the 
non-zero pooling spread is a result of the informed traders’ threat on the specialist. If the threat from 
informed traders is very large (i.e., either T or α is large, which means that informed trading is less 
restricted or the value of private information is large), the term under the square root of equation (7) 
can be negative. In such a case, the market will breakdown because the specialist cannot compensate 
himself with the revenue from liquidity traders. We now examine under which conditions the term 
under the square root is negative, i.e.,      
0)2(*)( 22  TTqT  .              (8) 
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To shed further light on the equilibrium spread, we show that the equilibrium spread may be 
efficient or inefficient, where inefficiency is defined as follows. 
Definition. A pooling spread sp that satisfies (6) is inefficient if and only if there exist spreads ls and 
is  such that 
(i) ls < sp,  
(ii) is < sp, and 
(iii) )()( li sRsC  . 
Lemma 1 in BMW characterizes the condition under which the pooling spread is inefficient, 
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2/*qsp  . By definition, the equilibrium is inefficient if it occurs at a point for which ∂si/∂sl > 0. 
Applying this condition to 0))(()*(2  iill ssTsqs  , we find that any spread larger 
than 2/*max qs  , which maximizes the specialist’s revenue, is inefficient. Because the specialist’s 
revenue function is identical between our and BMW models, Lemma 1 applies to our model as well. 
Using Lemma 1, we now restate Theorem 1 in BMW, which gives the condition for the pooling 



















 .                   (11) 
Solving (11) in terms of α and T respectively, we obtain the following theorem: 
 





















Theorem 1 shows that the pooling equilibrium is likely to be inefficient either when the value of 
private information is large relative to the revenue generated by liquidity trading (as measured by *q ) 
or when informed trading is highly sensitive to the value of private information (when T is large, i.e., 
informed trading is less restricted). This result expands BMW’s Theorem 1 by explicitly incorporating 
the elasticity of informed trading with respect to the value of private information into model 
formulation.          
 Theorem 2 in BMW states that when there is nonzero probability of trade driven by private 
information, there always exist values of α for which a pooling equilibrium exists and is inefficient. 
This implies that as the value of private information increases, the market first reaches an inefficient 
equilibrium, and then breaks down. The proof of Theorem 2 requires that the upper bound of α for the 
                                                        
3 Derivation of these results requires lengthy algebraic operations, which are available from the authors upon 
request.  
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market to remain open (i.e., the right-hand side of equation (9)) exceeds the upper bound of α for the 


















 .               (12) 
Since the above inequality always holds,4 the market will first reach an inefficient equilibrium before 
it breaks down as the value of the private information increases. Hence, BMW’s Theorem 2 holds 
even when the size of informed trades increases with the value of private information.      
We now examine whether the upper bound of T for the market to remain open (i.e., the 



























After rearrangement and simplification, we obtain the following results. If 0* q , (1) the 


















 ; and (2) the market breaks down first as T 












If 0* q , the market breaks down quickly as T increases because either the specialist cannot 
take the loss from informed trading or liquidity trading reduces quickly, which in turn leaves the 
specialist with only informed traders. 
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The effect of model parameters on the pooling equilibrium spread 
 In this section we examine how the pooling equilibrium spread is related to model parameters. 





















.         (13) 
The sign of (13) alternates from positive to negative at α = q*/δ, showing that the pooling equilibrium 
spread does not monotonically increase with α when the trade size of informed traders increases with 
α.5 The specialist widens the spread as α increases at the low level of α (i.e., α < q*/δ). At α = q*/δ, 










. Once α becomes larger than 
q*/δ, the specialist narrows the spread as α increases. The specialist narrows the spread as α increases 
because larger expected losses to informed traders can be offset by larger trading volume (and thus 
larger revenues) by (from) liquidity traders resulted from smaller spreads. This result differs sharply 
from the result of the BMW model. BMW show that the pooling equilibrium spread increases 
monotonically with α when informed trading is inelastic to α.  
 The partial derivative of the equilibrium spread with respect to  is simplified to the following 















Hence, the pooling spread increases monotonically with α if liquidity trading is inelastic to trading 
cost. Combined with the result in BMW, therefore, we conclude that the pooling spread increases 
                                                        
5 The value of α at which market breaks down is greater than the value of α at which sp reaches its 














































  since 02 T . 
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monotonically with α if either demand for liquidity trades is inelastic to trading costs (i.e., spread) or 
demand for information-based trading is inelastic to trading profits. The positive relation between sp 
and α in the former case reflects the specialist’s need to curve information-based trading given fixed 
liquidity trading. The positive relation between sp and α in the latter case reflects the specialist’s need 
to set a wider spread when faced with larger expected losses to informed traders, which will 
counterbalance the reduced revenue from liquidity based trading.   
























s p . 
The intuition behind this result is simple. All else being equal, the specialist’s loss to informed traders 
increases with the informed traders’ trading sensitivity to the expected trading profit. Therefore, the 
specialist increases the spread as T increases. 





















s p . 
The spread decreases with an increase in the fixed liquidity trading volume. All else being equal, the 
larger fixed liquidity volume increases the specialist’s revenue for any spread and allows the specialist 
to quote a narrower spread in equilibrium. 
 
3.2. Equilibrium with an active specialist 
As in BMW, we assume that an active specialist seeks to distinguish between informed and 
liquidity-motivated trades. Traders are represented by brokers and the specialist separates informed 
trades from liquidity-motivated trades to the extent that brokers are able to do so. The active specialist 
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differs from the passive one in several important ways. The active specialist may observe after the fact 
whatever information was available to the broker at the time of a trade. The active specialist may 
sanction brokers who misrepresented an informed trade as a liquidity trade. In addition, the active 
specialist can increase the value of broker’s franchise by offering terms of trade that depend on the 
broker’s representation of trading motive. 
The optimization problem for the specialist, acting as a rational agent, is to quote a spread 
pair ),( li ss that maximizes the broker’s expected profits subject to the zero-profit constraint and to 
incentive-compatibility constraints that induce brokers to reveal their signals truthfully BMW (p. 75). 
We identify the range of pairs that is consistent with potential equilibrium. 
 As in BMW, we call λ ( 15.0   ) the probability that the broker’s inference about the nature 
of the trade is correct and assume that the probability of a correct inference is the same whether the 
trade is liquidity- or information-motivated. We further assume that with probability γ the specialist 
will observe the noisy signal the broker receives at the time of the trade. It is not relevant to our 
analysis whether the broker was correct; it matters only that there is some probability that the 
specialist can eventually infer whether the broker intended to be truthfully. 
The specialist gains from liquidity-motivated traders and loses to traders with superior 
information. Because of the potential misidentification by the brokers, risk-neutral traders make their 
trading decisions based on the probability-weighted average of the spread pair ),( li ss quoted by the 
specialist. Therefore, the expected spread faced by liquidity and informed traders and their respective 
demand schedules are as follows:    
il
e
l sss )1(   ,                    (14) 
l)1( sss i
e












q   .                               (17) 




l ss , ) into actual spreads ),( li ss for a given value of λ 
according to the following function:  
),,(),( ei
e
lil ssSss  .                                                        (18) 






l sqssR  and 
2)()( ei
e
i sTsC   , 




l ss , ) to satisfy 




l sTsqs  .                            (19) 
The spread pair quoted by the specialist must also satisfy the following two incentive 
compatibility conditions. First, for a broker to reveal truthfully whether a trade is liquidity motivated, 
the liquidity spread cannot exceed the informed spread. This is the incentive compatible constraint for 
the brokers who are representing liquidity trading, 
li ss  .                                  )( lIC  
Second, for the brokers to truthfully disclose the informed trades, the threat by the specialist 
contingent on detection of intentional misrepresentation must exceed the benefit from doing so. 
Following BMW (p. 77), we define the incentive compatible constraint for the brokers who are 
representing informed trading as  
])([  CssNss lili   .                          )( iIC  
where N is the number of broker orders over some interval that will be treated by the specialist as 
information-motivated, C is the cost imposed by the specialist on brokers who misrepresented trade 
motives, and all other variables are the same as previously defined. 
 Figure 2 shows the graphic representation of equilibrium with an active specialist. The vertical 
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axis represents either the quoted informed spread or the expected informed spread. Likewise, the 
horizontal axis represents the quoted or expected spread for liquidity traders. Solving for the 
zero-profit condition (19) for 
e














  .                        (20)  
 Incentive compatibility for liquidity traders requires that the equilibrium quoted spread pair lie 
to the left of )(ICl . Incentive compatibility of informed traders requires that the equilibrium quoted 
spread pair lie below )(ICi . Admissible solutions to the specialist’s maximization problem for a 
given λ lie on S(λ), and thus are bounded by s, which represents the quoted liquidity trade spread for 
which )(ICi  is binding, and s , which is equal to the pooling equilibrium spread ps . 
 The minimum point along the zero-profit locus occurs at smax, corresponding to the value of 
e
ls  
that maximizes the expected revenue from liquidity trades. As in the case of the pooling equilibrium, 
2/*max qs  . Combinations of els and 
e
is to the right of smax are strictly inefficient. Both liquidity 




is along the 
zero-profit locus. The locus of points labeled S(λ) represents the mapping using the zero-profit locus 
of expected spreads into the corresponding locus of quoted-spread pairs for a given value of λ. For λ < 
1, the locus of zero-profit actual spread pairs will lie above and to the left of the locus of zero-profit 





is ) pairs to the left of )(ICl . )(ICi constrains the solution to ),( li ss pairs to the right of the 
boundary it defines. Thus, the specialist is constrained to quoting spread pairs along the segment S(λ) 
bounded by )(ICl  and )(ICi in Figure 2 given the value of λ as the informativeness of the broker’s 
signal. This corresponds to expected liquidity spreads between s and s . 
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Market breakdown condition 
Substituting (14) and (15) into (19), and letting )(ICi binding, the lower bound of ls  (i.e., s) 
must satisfy the following condition  























222  TaTqTaqTTaaT  .        (22) 
From the above equation, the condition that must be satisfied for equilibrium to exist with an 
active specialist is  
*2*44888*2* 2222 qTaqTTaaTTaTaTaqq    
022 22   TaT .                            (23)




















 .                 (24) 








 ), we find that the upper bound of   
















 measures the specialist’s ability to sanction brokers identified as 
having exploited private information. Hence, our result reveals that for a given set of parameters for 







) over brokers. 
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 .   (25) 







T ), it can be shown that the upper bound of T for the 



















.          (26) 
Hence our result shows that for a given set of parameters for which the passive specialist closes the 








  The results in Section 4.2 of BMW’s paper are valid in the extended setting. Lemma 2 and 
Theorem 3 in BMW remain valid in our model because they follow directly from the model setup. 
Hence, the equilibrium value of 
e
ls  is in the set bounded by s <
e
ls < s  and the expected spread faced 
by liquidity traders under an active specialist is always smaller than or equal to the spread set by a 
passive specialist. The ability to sanction those brokers who attempt to disguise the motives for 
trading gives the specialist the leverage necessary to weaken the adverse selection problem and 
thereby improve the terms of trade for liquidity traders. 
 Likewise, Lemma 3 and Theorem 4 in BMW continue to hold in our model.7 Hence the 
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aa  , 
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ls > 0. Applying this condition 
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specialist’s ability to improve the terms for liquidity traders is enhanced as the broker’s ability to infer 
the motivation for a trade increases (i.e., ∂s/∂λ < 0). Also, the specialist’s ability to differentiate 
between liquidity and informed traders improves the terms of trade for both traders. The spread 
quoted by a passive specialist is more likely to be inefficient when the information asymmetry is 
higher. Thus, the specialist’s leverage over brokers is most likely to lead to better terms for informed 
traders when their information advantage is greatest. The ability to charge lower spreads to liquidity 
traders under higher informational asymmetry generates increased revenues that can be used to reduce 
the spread charged to informed traders.               
 Lemma 2 shows that the expected-spread pair under the active specialist will always be efficient 
as long as the pooling equilibrium spread is efficient. Theorem 5 in BMW shows that the 
active-specialist equilibrium could be efficient even when the pooling equilibrium is not if the 
specialist has enough leverage over brokers identified as having exploited private information. By 
setting s < smax and after simplification, it can be shown that market parameters that result in an 
inefficient equilibrium in a pooling environment will result in an efficient equilibrium is a separating 
environment if the specialist’s ability to sanction brokers identified as having exploited private 










,                  (27) 
 
















22 )**2*2128*482 qqqTTsTsqsTsTT  
                                                                                                                                                                            




l sTsqs  , we can show that Theorem 4 holds in our model. 
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Thus the active specialist always produces Pareto-efficient terms of trade if he has enough 
leverage over brokers even when the volume of informed trades is elastic in trading profits. 
 
4. Conclusion  
Benveniste, Marcus, and Wilhelm (1992) bring to light an important intermediary role of 
exchange specialists. They show that a specialist who distinguishes informed traders from uninformed 
traders achieves equilibrium that Pareto-dominates a pooling equilibrium in which he does not 
differentiate between the two types of traders. We extend their study by replacing its restrictive 
assumption that informed traders always trade a fixed size with a more reasonable assumption that 
informed traders buy/sell lager sizes when they have more valuable private information. 
Our analyses show that although some of BMW’s results remain valid under the alternative 
assumption, the assumption of inelastic informed trading obscures a number of other valuable 
implications of the model. By reformulating the model with a more reasonable assumption that the 
transaction size of informed traders is elastic in the expected profit of trades, we show that the model 
yields many more valuable insights. For example, we show that the pooling equilibrium spread does 
not monotonically increase with the value of private information. We also show that the pooling 
equilibrium spread increases with α if liquidity trading is inelastic to trading cost. We obtain several 
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Fig. 1. The passive specialist equilibrium. R(S) and C(S) are the revenue and cost curves of the specialist. 
smax is revenue maximized spread. Intersections of R(S) and C(S) determine solutions to the specialist’s 
problem. However, competition requires that the smaller spread to be the feasible pooling spread. If the 
specialist quotes a spread that is greater than α, the informed traders will not trade. As a result, the 
cost curve C(s) coincides with the horizontal axis for spreads greater than α. 
Dollars 
smax sp 




























Fig. 2. The active specialist equilibrium. The specialist’s zero-profit constraint (ZP) determines the locus of 




l ss , ). S(λ) represents the mapping of expected spread pairs into quoted spread 
pair for a given λ. Incentive compatible for liquidity trader requires that the equilibrium spread pair lie to 
the left of (ICl). Incentive compatible for informed trader requires that the equilibrium spread pair lie to the 
right of (ICl). Feasible solutions to the specialist’s maximization problem for a given λ lie on S(λ), and thus 
are bounded by s , which represents the quoted spread liquidity spread for which (ICi) is binding, and s , 
which is equivalent to the pooling spread. 
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